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Byng's and Currie's 
Commanders 
A Still Untold Story 
of the Canadian Corps 
Patrick H. Brennan 
In 1915, the Canadian Corps was little more than a rabble of enthusiastic amateurs. Yet by 
1917-18, it had become an accomplished 
professional fighting force, one characterized by 
Denis Winter as "much the most effective unit 
in the BEF" and by Shane Schreiber as "the 
shock army of the British Empire." 1 While 
Canadian military historians have studied this 
evolution extensively few have examined the 
decisive element in the transformation - the 
development of a cadre of proficient senior 
combat officers. No one questions Currie's status 
as Canada's best fighting general, but of the 
supporting team he and his predecessor, General 
Byng, assembled we know precious little. Who, 
then, were the men commanding the Corps' four 
divisions, 12 infantry brigades and supporting 
machine gun and artillery units - the senior 
officers whose abilities as trainers and fighters 
were integral to the CEF's battlefield success? 
From Flanders to Vimy these mainly 
Canadian-born, militia-trained officers learned 
how to command by commanding. Their 
apprenticeship taught them that their militia 
training hardly prepared them for the war in 
which they were now engaged, and that the 
militia's patronage-ridden system of promotion 
in a fighting army got men killed. Fighting a 
modern war demanded that all ranks be 
properly trained and equipped professionals. 
From hard lessons they developed the "Canadian 
way of war" characterized by meticulous 
planning, training and rehearsal, artillery-
infantry co-ordination, and innovative tactics. 
T w o factors p roved essent ia l to this 
transformation, and contributed mightily to the 
Canadian army's growing success on the Western 
Front. The first was the establishment of the 
merit principal in promotion at the senior level, 
a process underway by 1916 and confirmed by 
Sam Hughes' removal in November, 1916. In 
theory at least, Hughes' firing cleared the path 
for Canada's "best and brightest" officers to take 
command of the nation's army. The second was 
the institutionalization and standarization of 
learning within the army - a policy implemented 
by Byng and expanded by Currie in which the 
battalion, brigade and divisional commanders 
played a central and indispensable role. 
Professionalization of the senior officer corps 
was thus a crucial step in the transformation of 
the CEF into a first-rate fighting force. 2 
Military historians have largely inferred what 
is known about the men who commanded the 
Corps' infantry divisions and brigades and 
specialized supporting arms. Good armies have 
good commanders; from Vimy Ridge onward the 
Canadian Corps was very good, Ipso facto, our 
commanders must have been very good. But our 
knowledge of these individuals extends little 
beyond this generalization. Jack Granatstein 
concluded in The Generals, his study of 
Canada's Second World War commanders, that 
the Hundred Days "demonstrated...Canadian 
generals were the peers of those in any country."3 
A.M.J. Hyatt, Currie's biographer, has more 
cautiously asserted that while "a description of 
Canadian generals during the First World War 
is hardly a tale of great captains, one could argue 
that the quality of generalship among Canadians 
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General Sir Julien Byng talking to Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie, February 1918. 
In France was very high."4 Why have Byng's and 
Currie's commanders, with rare exceptions, not 
been studied? Perhaps, as Arthur Lower 
concluded, Canadians "became intensely proud 
of their fighting men, though characteristically 
they took little interest in their generals." 5 
Unfortunately, this disinterest has also extended 
to Canada's military historians.6 
Who were the combat officers of general rank 
who served under Byng and Currie during the 
period from late May 1916 through the end of 
the war? This study includes only those who held 
their appointments for an extended period - at 
least two months - with those whose tenures 
were terminated by the end of hostilities 
naturally excepted. Of these 48 officers, seven 
were British regulars, leaving 41 members of 
the CEF. 7 
Drawing on the personnel records of these 
individuals, one can draw several useful 
generalizations. 8 Most - 74 percent - were 
Canadian-born, a notably higher proportion than 
was found among the ranks (generally accepted 
at only slightly more than 50 percent) and even 
among battalion commanders where the figure 
was 65 percent.9 At the time of enlistment, they 
were almost equally split between Central 
6 
Canada and the West: eleven lived in Ontario, 
nine in Quebec, seven in British Columbia, four 
in Mani toba, three each in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, and one in Nova Scotia. 1 0 Their 
average year of birth was 1873, and for those 
serving at war's end, when the GOC Heavy 
Artillery and six of the 12 infantry brigadiers 
were in their thirties, their average age was 42. 
Only three were francophones, and one of those 
- Brutinel - was a French national. As for 
religion, 62 percent were Anglicans, 21 percent 
Presbyterians, with Odium the lone Methodist. 
Only two of the anglophones - Elmsley and A.H. 
Macdonell - were Roman Catholic. 1 1 
All of them had prewar military experience, 
though it had been obtained in a variety of ways: 
nine were Canadian regulars at the war's 
outbreak, two had once served in the British 
army and another in the French, while the 
remaining 27 had served in the Canadian militia. 
A dozen had South African War experience, and 
22 of the 27 from the infantry commanded a 
battalion at the front. 
Their prewar careers confirm that most were 
solidly ensconced in the middle class with 
careers in the military, business or the 
professions. Apart from the nine serving in the 
2
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regular forces (Burstall, Elmsley, Ketchen, 
MacBrien, the two Macdonells, Panet, Thacker 
and Wil l iams) , a further two listed their 
occupation as "soldier" (Bell and Hilliam). 
Professional occupations accounted for a further 
dozen, including seven lawyers (John Clark, 
Embury, Griesbach, Hill, McLaren, Ormond and 
Alexander Ross), four engineers (Brutinel, 
Garnet Hughes, McNaughton and Tremblay), 
and one dentist (Stewart). Only two - Draper 
and Dyer - listed their occupations as farmers. 
Most of the remainder were in business and 
related activities: three were merchants (Rennie, 
Turner and Tuxford), McCuaig was a stock 
broker, while Arthur Currie, Dodds, and Odium 
were in real estate and insurance. King was in 
manufacturing, as was Loomis who was also a 
building contractor. John Ross was a miller. 
There was one senior civil servant (W. Hughes, a 
prison inspector), one newspaper publisher 
(Watson), one journalist (Odium's other career), 
a "secretary" (Mitchell), and an "agent" (Robert 
Clark). 
They were also a homogeneous group in 
another way - those who got to France generally 
s tayed there . Tenure of command was 
pronounced among senior officers during the 29 
month long Byng-Currie regime. At the end of 
May 1916, Byng inher i ted 22 senior 
commanders: four divisional commanders, 12 
infantry brigadiers, three divisional artillery 
commanders, 1 2 GOCs Royal Artillery (GOCRA) 
and Heavy Artillery (GOCHA) and a Brigadier-
General, General Staff. Of these, Mercer was 
promptly killed and Williams taken prisoner in 
the same action, necessi tat ing Lipset t ' s 
promotion to divisional command, Loomis's 
switch to replace Lipset t (and Odium's 
promotion from battalion to replace Loomis), 
and Elmsley's promotion from command of a 
cavalry regiment to replace Williams. Turner's 
replacement by Burstall as OC 2nd Division 
necessitated Morrison's promotion to GOCRA, 
and Panet's promotion to replace Morrison. Only 
four of the remaining senior commanders Byng 
inherited were replaced during the ensuing 
twelve months, all of them, including Sam 
Hughes' brother and son, for reasons which to 
varying degrees related to performance. Of 22 
officers, 15 were still there in one capacity or 
another when Byng left the Corps. 
Of the 25 senior commanders Currie 
inherited in June 1917 (including Currie's own 
replacement as OC the 1st Division, A .C . 
Macdonell), 1 3 Thirteen were still there at the 
armistice 17 months later. Of those Currie 
replaced, four were British or ex-British regulars 
who moved back to the British army and another 
- Bell - had been w o u n d e d . 1 4 From the 
remainder of that initial cadre, Loomis replaced 
Lipsett as OC 3rd Division while Rennie, A.H. 
Macdonell, Elmsley, McLaren and Hill were 
replaced as Brigadiers chiefly (though in 
Macdonell's case, certainly not solely) because 
they had worn out. The removal of Ketchen and 
Mitchell was dictated by performance. 1 5 
Most s t r ik ing is not the number of 
replacements but the number who continued to 
soldier on efficiently. Including Currie himself, 
seven officers served the full period, another 
seven served from two years to 28 months, while 
seven more served between 18 and 23 months. 
From the middle of 1916 onward, only a relative 
handful - maybe six - of the 42 Canadian officers 
seem to have been replaced for "deficient 
performance" without at least the extenuating 
circumstance of exhausting service at the front.16 
Another six fell into the latter category, several 
of them after a long period of exemplary 
service. 1 7 
Byng and Currie's commanders were a self-
confident group who had grown accustomed to 
leading and winning, important qualities in 
successful combat officers. A significant number 
had been with the army from the start at "Bloody 
Ypres" - seven future divisional commanders, 
eight infantry brigadiers, a GOCRA and GOCHA 
and three divisional artillery commanders. 1 8 
Some were promoted by virtue of Sam Hughes' 
patronage, most by virtue of merit, and not a 
few by virtue of both. Socio-economic profiles 
and tenures in command tell us some things 
about these men but explain little about how they 
performed individually, the level at which our 
understanding of them remains so deficient. A 
brief examination of the careers of four of these 
officers - William Griesbach, Frederick Loomis, 
Alex Ross and David Watson - confirms the value 
of more thorough studies. 
William "Billy" Griesbach was born in 1878 
in the prairie hamlet of Qu'Appelle in what is 
now Saskatchewan, the son of a North West 
7 
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Mounted Police officer and former British army 
regular. The young Griesbach saw action in 
South Africa as a trooper with the 2nd Canadian 
Mounted Rifles (CMR), subsequently serving in 
the militia in Edmonton where he pursued a 
successful career in law and politics. Griesbach 
undoubtedly used his militia involvement to 
make useful political and professional contacts, 
as did most of his peers, but he was also noted 
as one who took his avocation very seriously. 
Griesbach went overseas with the first contingent 
as commanding officer of the cavalry, only to be 
asked by his friend Sam Hughes to return to 
Canada and raise an infantry battal ion. 
Griesbach agreed reluctantly, on the minister's 
promise that the 49th would serve in the line 
and not be broken up as reinforcements. 1 9 
Griesbach and his men found themselves in 
the Ypres salient in mid-October 1915, and the 
"Forty-Niners" saw their first heavy action in the 
crushing German attack at Mount Sorrel in June 
1916. Though badly mauled, the unit helped 
blunt the enemy advance. The confused and 
bloody fighting at Kenora Trench on the Somme 
saw the 49th chewed up a second time, but both 
his brigadier, Archie "Batty Mac" Macdonell and 
divisional commander, Louis Lipsett, had seen 
enough to recommend Griesbach for a brigade 
command. Despite Currie's initial reluctance, 
Brigadier-General William "Billy" Griesbach (right) with 
Brigadier-General H.M Dyer. 
Byng approved his promotion to command the 
1st Brigade in February 1917. 2 0 
Little direct information survives on how 
Griesbach's men viewed their commander. He 
seems to have been respected rather than 
"loved," at least in the way Macdonell was "loved" 
by his men. Griesbach was sharp and brusque, 
a strict but fair disciplinarian, and a stickler for 
details. Certainly he was as demanding of himself 
as he was of his men. Despite presenting a rather 
intimidating demeanor to subordinates, he went 
out of his way to listen to them, and he seems to 
have been an excellent teacher. Manifestly brave, 
he did not shirk from putting himself in harm's 
way, something his officers and men must have 
admired. 
Gr iesbach be l i eved that if his men 
experienced success, they would believe in 
themselves, and their morale and preparation 
for combat became high priorities. No where was 
this attribute more in evidence than in his 
tireless preparation for the transition to semi-
open and open warfare the Corps anticipated in 
1918. "No man [wjould be allowed to get back 
to Canada and say that he had a good idea or 
suggestion upon any subject connected with the 
war and that he could not get it considered by a 
higher authority," he liked to remind his 
of f icers . 2 1 Even though Griesbach wryly 
acknowledged that "most officers behave much 
better in actual warfare than they do in 
manoeuvers, he monitored his battalion training 
exercises with a critical eye. Mistakes were 
opportunities for learning - ruthlessly exposed 
but constructively discussed. He had long 
believed in allowing his battalion commanders 
some leeway in planning and executing their 
attacks. Open warfare, he knew, would make still 
g rea te r demands on their in i t ia t ive . 
Consequently he designed exercises to encourage 
initiative and adaptability at all levels of 
command. After two and a half years of the 
hardest experience, Griesbach had learned 
much, and his ideas on how to master the 
battlefield were crystallizing. Dissecting one 
disappointing training exercise, he reminded the 
two participating battalion commanders that: 
The essence of success in the attack is to bring 
a superior number of troops in on a point where 
the enemy is weak and absolutely assure success 
8 
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at that point. In a task of this sort swiftness and 
decision is [sic] necessary... Commanders must 
learn to appreciate situations. They must learn 
to deliver a real punch based upon a sound 
conception.22 
In an army where the abler commanders 
were intent on learn ing how to apply 
technological firepower to the battlefield, 
Griesbach was especially noteworthy. His 
memoranda to Macdonell and Corps during 
1918 are full of recommendations on how best 
to organize the principal elements of the attack 
- field artillery, machine guns and tanks - in 
light of the rapidly evolving battlefield conditions 
that characterized the Last Hundred Days. 2 3 
Griesbach's greatest tactical stroke came in 
the 1st Brigade's attack on the Vise-en-Artois 
Switch on the early morning of 30 August 1918, 
part of the preliminaries to the Drocourt-Queant 
attack. The plan was principally Griesbach's own 
design - he had laboured throughout the 
previous day to draw up three versions, finally 
settling on the more risky but promising option 
and then winning the approval of Macdonell and 
his staff. Macdonell was right to call it "bold." 2 4 
In a sort of long left-hook, Griesbach's infantry 
pushed north behind an ingenious artillery 
barrage expertly thrown together by Thacker that 
crossed the face of the D-Q Line to the east to 
take the Switch in the flank. Heavy casualties 
were inflicted on the enemy, all for the loss of 
fewer than 700 of his men. 
But what the official history describes as a 
"skillfully planned operation carried out with 
daring" almost came unstuck. 2 5 Many of his 
infantry had become disoriented by the odd axis 
of attack, parallel to the main enemy defensive 
position. Failing to face east once the Switch had 
been taken left the flank open to a strong enemy 
counterattack which, in due course, the 
Germans provided. Only the intervention of the 
2nd Battalion's commander, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Lome McLaughlin, pistol drawn with purpose, 
rallied panicking troops at the point where the 
Germans almost broke through. Griesbach's 
decisive action to send forward his reserve 
battalion stabilized the situation. 
Macdonell was effusive in his praise of the 
operation, and attributed the success to his 
companies' and platoons' mastery of open 
warfare tactics. The commanding officer of the 
1st Battal ion, Lieutenant-Colonel Alber t 
Sparling, maintained that "it was only from 
previous training and initiative on the part of all 
ranks that the situation was grasped and the 
attack pressed forward so successfully...," while 
Griesbach concluded that "the brigade benefited 
tremendously by the training in open warfare 
that it received.. .during the months of May and 
June last.. .and the attack methods there taught 
were practiced with success." 2 6 
Griesbach became a successful commander 
for several reasons. Never satisfied, his 
observant after-battle reports started with a 
critique of his own plan, then proceeded to 
highlight specific deficiencies revealed in the 
Corps' capabilities. There was much that was 
typically "Canadian" of Griesbach. Like so many 
of them, he applied his talents and self-
confidence earned from a successful civilian 
profession to the profession of war. Thrown into 
combat command with minimal preparation, 
Griesbach made his share of mistakes in 1916 
but he survived them. He readily acknowledged 
the benefits of being mentored by a talented 
senior - Macdonell - under whose immediate 
command he served for all but six of his 37 
months at the front. 
Griesbach was a successful commander 
because he could study war and carefully 
incorporate what he learned. In an army that 
institutionalized, then universalized what it had 
learned, officers like Griesbach made a valuable 
contribution and naturally found their way to 
the top. Finally, Griesbach worked well on the 
battlefield: "Courageous, resolute,.. .full of daring 
and resourcefulness," in the words of the 
admiring Macdonell, possessed of a "well-
balanced and analytical mind...," and "the 
quickest officer that I have ever had anything to 
do with to grasp the tactical advantages or 
disadvantages of a given situation...."2 7 
Rather less is known about the career of 
Frederick Oscar William Loomis. He was born 
in Sherbrooke in the Eastern Townships in 
1870. By the outbreak of the war, he had 
established a thriving manufacturing and 
contracting business in Montreal, where he also 
served in the militia. In the fall of 1914, Loomis 
went overseas as commander of the 13th 
Battalion that he handled capably in the chaos 
of 2nd Ypres. Loomis was appointed temporary 
9 
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commander of the 7th Brigade in March 1916, 
replacing A.C. Macdonell who was ill. He moved 
to the 11th Brigade for two months, and finally 
to the 2nd Brigade - an all-Western Canadian 
unit - in early July as Lipsett's replacement. 
There, with the exception of three months' 
compassionate leave to Canada in early 1918, 
he remained in command until early September 
1918. Currie thought him one of his ablest 
brigadiers, commenting once that "brigadiers 
like him do not grow on gooseberry bushes [and] 
and I would not lose him for the world...." 2 8 
During his tenure with the 2nd, Loomis was 
involved in several bitter engagements. His 
troops spearheaded the last Canadian attack at 
Passchendaele, on 10 November 1917 where the 
survivors had to hold on to their captured 
positions against a ferocious German counter-
bombardment. An Australian noted grimly of 
their situation: "If the Canadians can hold on, 
they are wonderful troops." 2 9 Hold on they did, 
surely a compliment to their tenacity, but also 
to their commander's abilities to train and lead 
them. 
The highlight of Loomis's war came in early 
September 1918, when a reluctant Major-
General Lipsett was transferred to the British 
army. 3 0 Earlier in the year, Currie had identified 
five of his brigadiers suitable for divisional 
command. 3 1 As a successful fighting officer 
almost continuously since the spring of 1915, 
Loomis was Currie's choice to command the 2nd 
Div i s ion . It was a s ingular honour. A 
"Canadianization" policy meant that Canadian 
officers could only be promoted within the four-
divison Corps. The highest command most 
Canadian infantry officers could hope for was a 
brigade. The rapid collapse of the German army 
allowed Loomis to exercise his command in only 
one major engagement, but the thrust across the 
Canal du Nord in late September involved some 
very heavy fighting by his division. His war ended 
in Mons, where he can be seen, but is rarely 
identified, among the senior Canadian officers 
taking part in the ceremonies marking the 
liberation of the town on 11 November 1918. 
In 1914, Alexander Ross was practising law 
in Regina. The Scottish immigrant was then 34 
years old. Ross did not enlist in the first 
cont ingent on the advice of his mil i t ia 
commander, J.F.L. Embury, who hoped his unit 
would be sent overseas intact. When Ottawa 
authorized a second contingent, Embury was 
appoin ted command ing officer of the 
Saskatchewan contribution, the 28th Battalion, 
and Ross joined as a company commander. By 
the time he reached France in the fall of 1915, 
Brigadier F.O.W. Loomis (middle 
row, centre) with his HQ staff, 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, April 
1918: 
Front row, I. to r.- Major R.H. 
Winslow. Captains H.D. Ives, R.J. 
Paget. 
Centre row - Lieutenants S.C. 
Graham, Major JP. Mackenzie, 
Loomis , Capta ins E.H.L 
Johnston, E.L. Brown. 
Rear row - L ieutenant H.W. 
Dawson , Capta in Grant and 
Lieutenant M. de Bishop. 
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Above: General Sir Arthur Currie taking the salute in the Grand 
Place in Mons during the march past. General Loomis is the 5th 
figure to the right of Currie, in front of the other officers. Major-
General E.W.B. Morrison, commander of Canadian Corps 
artillery is to the left of Loomis and Brigadier G.J. Farmar, 
DA&QMG is to the right. 11 November 1918. 
Right: Brigadier-General Alexander Ross. 
he had been promoted second-in-command with 
the rank of Major. The 28th underwent its 
"baptism of fire" at St. Eloi in the spring of 1916, 
a chaotic battle which Ross later remembered 
as "discouraging." Many officers were replaced 
after St. Eloi, though not enough to satisfy Ross. 
On the Somme, the 28th was involved in very 
heavy and costly fighting. Early on, Embury, who 
was already suffering from "the strain of duties," 
was wounded and had to be replaced. Byng 
tabbed Ross to take over. 
It proved quite an apprenticeship, but, like 
Griesbach, Ross survived. He felt the Canadians 
were finally beginning to learn some valuable 
lessons which would save infantrymen's lives, 
starting with "proper artillery support..., 
attacking on a wider front with fewer men in the 
front [line] and more in support and, of course, 
[all with] the general knowledge of what they were 
to do, and... preparation down to the very last 
deta i l . . . . " 3 2 Byng organized meet ings of 
divisional, brigade and battalion commanders 
and other officers where the hard-earned lessons 
of the Somme and new tactical ideas were frankly 
discussed. As Ross vividly remembered 47 years 
later, "He [Byng] revolutionized a lot of our 
organization and made it much more sensible... 
7
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[and] he gave me new ideas, things that appealed 
to my common sense." 3 3 Byng also was willing 
to listen to Canadian officers who, with their 
basically civilian mindsets, were more open to 
learning and had less to forget. 
Ross was an able pragmatist, representing 
the Canadian militia officer at his best. He joked 
that he ran his battalion like he ran his law office 
in Regina, but few could argue with the results. 
Vital in an army that almost always attacked, 
Ross clearly had a knack for maintaining esprit 
de corps among his veterans while rapidly 
integrating inexperienced reinforcements. He 
was keen on promotion from the ranks as well, 
preferring that men "who had learned in the 
field" train and lead. In battle, Ross proved his 
coolness under fire, and he reveled in the 
independence he enjoyed as a bat tal ion 
commander. "The higher echelons had to tell you 
what their plan was but you had to carry it out 
and the less they interfered the better...," he later 
emphasized. "It was left to you largely as to how 
you were going to do it." 3 4 
Ross was on the list of 12 officers Currie 
was considering for promotion to brigadier in 
1918. 3 5 His opportunity came during the 
Drocourt-Queant attack when Bell was wounded 
and the Corps commander picked him to take 
over the 6th Brigade, a post he held until the 
armistice. Ross's service as a brigadier was brief, 
but it points out that a pool of talented officers 
was available when the men were required - eight 
were promoted to brigade commands in 1918. 
It also vindicates the struggles of Byng, Currie 
and others to ensure merit ruled promotion and 
to es tabl ish the o rgan ized doctr ine of 
preparation and attack in the CEF that ensured 
such command transitions would be relatively 
seamless. 
David Watson, the 4th Division's only 
commander, was a rather more controversial 
figure. Watson was a self-made man who became 
a wealthy Quebec City newspaper publisher with 
a "successful" militia career. He was also deeply 
involved in Conservative party politics, and 
much admired by Sam Hughes. On cursory 
examination, Watson's career seems to fit the 
mould of the successful militia officer who 
enlisted in 1914 and led a battalion (the 2nd) 
overseas. He fought at Second Ypres with some 
competence and was soon promoted to 
command a brigade (the 5th). In May 1916, he 
received the plumb job - command of the newly-
formed 4th Div i s ion . Watson is most 
remembered as one of two wealthy officers 
(Odium was the other) who covered Sir Arthur 
Currie's bad debts and thus saved Canada's 
grea tes t mi l i ta ry chief from public 
embarrassment and possible dismissal in 
1917. 3 6 However, upon closer examination, 
Watson's military career was somewhat more 
disputed. 
Even by the generous standard of senior 
militia officers in the CEF, the dashing, charming 
Watson was a hopeless self-promoter. In the 
aftermath of the St. Eloi debacle in February 
1916, one of his battalion commanders , 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Gunn, was intent on 
resigning and demanded to air his grievances 
about Watson with the Army commander. Fearing 
he would lose his chance of commanding of the 
new 4th Division - a post he had openly 
campaigned for - if the criticisms got out, he 
offered the disgruntled Gunn one of the brigades 
in his new division. Although Gunn flatly rejected 
Watson's offer, he agreed not to forward his letter 
of resignation up the chain of command. After 
the war, Gunn regretted that he had not pressed 
the matter "as Watson later, through bad 
Major-General David Watson, commander of 
4th Canadian Division. 
8
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Officers watch a practice attack, October 1917. Left to right: Prince Arthur of Connaught, Lieutenant-General Arthur 
Currie, Brigadier Victor Odium and Major-General David Watson. 
judgement and looking for kudos, cost the lives 
of many Canadians."3 7 
Watson's campaigning paid off as Hughes 
gave him the 4th Division, rather than Henry 
Burstall, an experienced regular. Watson then 
gathered as many experienced troops in England 
for his new unit as he could find, despite 
knowing none of them would see battle for 
months at a time when the army in France was 
desperately seeking reinforcements.38 When the 
going got tough for Hughes, Watson was wise 
enough to distance himself. Gunn was not the 
only subordinate officer to take issue with 
Watson's competence. By the end of 1917, 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Warden, who had 
raised the 102nd Battalion and then commanded 
it in Watson's division, had completely fallen out 
with both his brigadier (Odium) and Watson. 
Warden resigned his command, but not before 
regaling Currie with his opinions of his two 
superiors, describing "both [as] very mercenary 
men and political pullers who used their 
commands to gain public notice and repute.... " 3 9 
The evidence is little more than gossip, of course, 
but with Watson, the evidence does seem to 
accumulate. 
More damning was Watson's apparently 
excessive eagerness to fight the Hun, without a 
matching eagerness for the thorough planning 
that increasingly prevailed among other CEF 
commanders. This was clear in the ill-fated 4th 
Division trench raid on Hill 145 a little over a 
month before Vimy. This operation cost 687 
casualties when the gas attack failed to work, 
precisely what more cautious observers in the 
division - including several senior officers - had 
openly worried about. Both Watson and his very 
able British GSOl, Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund 
Ironside, displayed appalling overconfidence and 
particularly a lamentable - and for their troops, 
fatal - ignorance of gas warfare practices. 4 0 
Although Watson's 4th Division generally 
performed ably thereafter, the 11th and 12th 
Brigades' foredoomed attack at Mont Dury on 2 
September 1918 suggests that haste and 
sloppiness at divisional headquarters were never 
entirely eliminated. 4 1 The verdict on Watson's 
military competence - whether he should be 
classed among the first or second echelon of 
Canada's Great War commanders - awaits 
further research. 
Regardless of the ultimate verdict passed on 
Watson, by the last two years of the war the 
overall quality of Canadian combat generals was 
high and getting higher. Given that brigadiers 
had a better chance to control the battle as tactics 
became more fluid and complex, good brigadiers 
became more important to battlefield success 
as the war progressed. Moreover, the well-
13 
9
Brennan: Byng’s and Currie’s Commanders
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2002
Allied commanders in Bonn, 
Germany following the end of the 
war, December 1918: 
(I. to r.) Lieutenant-General Arthur 
Currie, commander, Canadian 
Corps; unknown; Major -General 
David Watson, commander 4th 
Canadian Division; Major-General 
Henry Burstall, commander 2nd 
Canadian Division; Field Marshal 
Alexander Haig, British 
Commander-in-Chief; Major-
General E.W.B. Morrison, 
commander of Canadian Corps 
artillery. 
developed Canadian system of institutionalized, 
universal ized learning would never have 
flourished had the senior commanders not been 
innovative and fully committed. The only 
alternative is to believe that the Corps' success 
depended almost entirely on Currie and a 
handful of brilliant British staff officers. 
A study of Byng and Currie's commanders 
will appreciably broaden our understanding of 
what made the Canadian Corps an increasingly 
effective fighting force from 1916 onward. What 
did "merit" mean when it came to promotion to 
senior command? Did divisional and brigade 
commanders possess individual training and 
war fighting philosophies and styles? Can we 
rank the capabilities of these commanders or 
were they interchangeable cogs in the CEF 
mach ine? If, as Harr is summar izes 
McNaughton's recollections, "Currie created an 
atmosphere which allowed for, in fact positively 
demanded, the movement of ideas from 
below," 4 2 who were the foremost generators of 
those ideas? 
Military historians have provided us with a 
portrayal of the Canadian Corps where the 
military personalities of the Corps commanders, 
various political characters, and the private 
soldier have been quite thoroughly researched 
and their respective roles in forging the Corps' 
fighting ability skillfully delineated. But of those 
few dozen officers who served immediately below 
the "Great Captain," practically nothing has been 
written and very little is known. Even the role of 
the Corps' chaplains has received more study. 
Yet all military historians acknowledge the 
hierarchical command structure of the army and 
the vital importance of understanding how that 
structure operated. Furthermore, despite the 
"Currie-centrism" which has dominated analysis 
of the Corps' generalship, implicit in all accounts 
of the Corps during the battles of 1917-18 is the 
belief that it was a team effort. Surely, as with 
ordinary soldiers, sappers and gunners, the 
senior officer ranks contained more than their 
share of talented individuals - men who had 
significant responsibilities for transforming the 
Corps from an enthusiastic rabble into a battle-
hardened and self-confident professional army. 
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We are unlikely to find that all our generals were 
the equals of a Griesbach, Ross or Loomis. Some 
will likely prove pedestrian or worse. But until 
we undertake fuller studies, our understanding 
of the Corps will remain incomplete, for we shall 
have only a fragmentary appreciation of the 
officers who trained the Corps' soldiers and then 
ordered (and sometimes led) them into battle. 
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